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Homer is acknowledged by Socrates as the educator of Hellas, “the most poetic of the poets and 
the first of tragedians” who provides the model around which the Hellenes order their lives (Rep 
607a).1 The first references to Homer in the Republic confirm the poet’s commanding civilizational 
influence on the Hellenes when both Socrates and Adeimantus speak of Homer in the context of 
what people have learned from him. In his refutation of Polemarchus’ definition of justice, 
“helping your friends, harming your enemies,” Socrates points out that this definition of justice 
makes a just man a kind of thief, something which Polemarchus must have learned from the 
Odyssey where Homer admires Odysseus’ grandfather, Autolycus, for excelling all men “in 
thievery and perjury” (Rep 334a–b; Odyssey 19.395–96).  
Polemarchus is not to be blamed for this misconception of justice, for, as Adeimantus recounts, 
the poets teach the Hellenes that justice is praised only for its beneficial consequences. Adeimantus 
cites the Odyssey as evidence of this teaching: 
 
Even as when a good king who rules in a god-fearing way, 
Upholds justice, and the black earth produces  
Wheat and barley, and his trees are laden with fruit 
His flock increases and the sea teems with fish.  
 (Rep 363b–c; Odyssey 19.109–13) 
 
People should be just for the rewards and reputations it brings and not for its own sake—the 
challenge that Glaucon and Adeimantus propose to Socrates to prove. 
Socrates’ proof that one should be just for its own sake is contrary to what Homer teaches. For 
instance, Homer shows the gods granting misfortune and evil to just people and their opposites a 
contrary life and mendicant priests and soothsayers swindling the rich with their claims that they 
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can expiate their family’s misdeeds and harm their enemies with spells and enhancements (364b–
c). These things are all possible because, as Homer states, the gods can be easily manipulated: 
 
The gods themselves may be swayed with sacrificial  
Feasts and soft prayers, libations and incense  
When men have gone too far and done wrong.  
 (Rep 364d–e; Iliad 9.497–501) 
 
Thus, Homer teaches the Hellenes that a person should be just not for its own sake but for the 
rewards it brings; a just person can suffer from misfortune while an unjust one can be blessed; and 
the gods, the dead, and the living can be influenced by magic, sacrifices, and prayers. As Glaucon’s 
story of Gyges’ ring illustrates (Rep 359d–360b), and as Adeimantus highlights, the “main point” 
is for Socrates to show why the just life is worthy for its own sake and superior to a life where one 
“seems” just while actually living unjustly (Rep 362d–363a).  
Socrates’ challenge is immense, as Homer appears to teach the Hellenes exactly the opposite: 
one should seem to be just to reap the rewards that a just reputation brings but in fact live an unjust 
life for the benefits that such a life offers. With the Hellenes raised in these values, what stratagem, 
Adeimantus asks Socrates, could be devised “to persuade a man with birth, wealth, or strength of 
body or soul that he ought to respect justice and not snicker at the very word?” (Rep 366c). For 
Homer’s influence on the Hellenes is more than cultural, social, or political: it is foundational.2 
Homer’s poetry is the mythical, cultural, and existential fabric that makes the Hellenes a people.3 
Without these stories, there are no Hellenes. Given this, how can Socratic philosophy succeed in 
showing the just life is superior to the unjust one? 
This “ancient quarrel between philosophy and poetry” seems to place an insurmountable burden 
on philosophy to prove its preeminence over poetry (Rep 607b).4 One option for Socrates is to 
eradicate Homeric poetry completely in the civic education of the guardians and leave only 
philosophy.5 However, such a strategy would not only deprive the Hellenes the civilizational fabric 
that makes them a people, but it also may not be effective in civic education, especially in the 
teaching of children who are not entirely receptive to reason.6 Another approach is to leave 
Homeric poetry alone and prepare only a few for philosophy: philosophers would provide lip-
service to the public about their beliefs in Homeric teaching while in private pursue a life of 
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reason.7 A final possibility is to create a rival myth that combines philosophy and poetry together 
in order to supplant Homer’s place as the educator of all Hellas.8 Socrates’ Myth of Er in Book X, 
and the dialogue the Republic itself, would be the types of philosophical myths that re-found the 
Hellenes as a people with a new set of values and way of life. 
In this article I argue that Socrates seeks to rehabilitate Homeric poetry as much as philosophy 
will permit by his selecting those passages that support his philosophical aims and censoring or 
modifying those excerpts that are contrary to it.9 Instead of repudiating Homer’s poetry altogether, 
Socrates recognizes that the foundational role his stories have for the Hellenes and therefore knows 
that they cannot be eradicated entirely; otherwise, the Hellenes would not exist as a people. 
Philosophy consequently must accommodate Homer’s poetry but only under its supervision in 
order for citizens to become just. By retaining the passages of Homer’s poetry that are compatible 
with his philosophy, Socrates is able the preserve the foundational role that Homer plays for the 
Hellenes, while, at the same time, prepare them for a more philosophic future. 
This reading of the Republic is compatible with previous scholarship on this question: Socrates 
does eliminate Homer’s poetry from the city but not all of his poetry; Socrates expects only a few 
to be able to study philosophy but leaves poetry for the many; and Socrates’ own poetry, like the 
Myth of Er and the Republic itself, are a new type of philosophical myth but still anchored in the 
foundational fabric of Homer’s poetry. According to this reading, Socrates is neither a 
philosophical radical nor a political revolutionist but a pragmatic reformer who works within the 
cultural milieu of his civilization to make it more receptive to a life of philosophy. Although he 
had failed in his own time, Socrates’ attempt provides a blueprint for us today as we wrestle with 
the questions like national identity and civic education in our own country.10  
 
I. 
Socrates’ first criticism of the poets, including Homer, is they make false claims about the gods, 
spirits, heroes, the dead, and just people. When discussing the education of the guardians, Socrates 
condemns the stories that Homer tells—“false stories which are told and still being told”—because 
they misrepresent the nature of the gods and heroes (Rep 377d–e). Stories like Uranus, Zeus, and 
Cronus chaining and castrating each other and swallowing their children or those of “Hera 
enchained by her son and Hephaestus hurled by his father out of Olympus for trying to defend his 
mother, and the battle of the gods that Homer tells” will not be permitted in Socrates’ polis (Rep 
Socrates’ Homer in the Republic 82 
377e, 378d–e; Iliad 1.586–94).11 These stories need to be censored because they will permanently 
damage the character of the young, who are easily impressionable and vulnerable to “any stamp 
one wishes to put on them” (Rep 377b).  
Socrates’ first law for religious speech and writing therefore is that the god is the cause only of 
good (Rep 380c; 379c). Socrates does not tolerate the poets’ error that the gods are responsible for 
both good and evil, as Homer states:  
 
Two jars of lots stand in Zeus’ hall 
One of good, the other of evil. 
 
And to whomever Zeus gives a mixed portion, he “falls now into good, now into evil,” while one 
who receives unmixed evil is “driven by misery over the entire earth.” (Rep 379c; Iliad 24.257–
32). Socrates also suppresses the Homeric lines that call Zeus “a dispenser alike of good and evil 
to mortals”; when the gods goad the Trojan hero, Pandarus, to violate his oath that could have 
potentially have led to the peaceful return of Helen of Troy; and other such tales (Rep 379d–e; 
Iliad 4.866ff). Any portrayal of the gods other than the cause of good would be censored by 
Socrates. 
Socrates’ second law for religious speech and writing is that the god is absolutely simple and 
truthful in both word and deed (Rep 382e).12 The god does not change or deceive others by visions, 
words, or sending signs to those awake or asleep, and the gods are not to be portrayed as sorcerers 
who change their shapes or become liars who mislead (Rep 383a). Socrates again specifically cites 
passages from Homer as examples of what type of poetry should be censored: 
 
The gods take the shapes of strangers 
As they visit the cities of mortals.  
 (Rep 381d; Odyssey 17.485–86) 
 
Other examples Socrates includes are the transformations of Proteus, Thetis, and Hera as well as 
Zeus sending a false dream to Agamemnon (Rep 383a; Iliad 2.1–34).  
Socrates next moves to the poets’ portrayals of the dead and spirits. When the poets depict 
death, they should do so in a way to make the guardians less fearful of it in order that they may 
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become brave (Rep 386b). When the poets do the contrary, those passages are to be deleted, like 
the Homeric excerpt when the shade of Achilles speaks to Odysseus in the Underworld: 
 
I would rather toil the soil, a serf to another 
To an indigent man without land 
Than rule and be king over all the dead who have perished.  
 (Rep 186c; Odyssey 11.489–91) 
 
Socrates continues to list a number of Homeric passages that depict the afterlife as “horrible, 
noisome, and putrid” (Rep 186d; Iliad 20.64–65); “deprived of one’s senses and understanding” 
(Rep 186d; Iliad 23.103–4); a life of “shadowy phantoms” (Rep 186d; Odyssey 10.495) where one 
“wails its doom” (Rep 186d; Iliad 16.856–57) and act like a “gibbering soul” (Rep 387a; Iliad 
23.100) that “squeaks and gibbers” (Rep 387a; Odyssey 24.6–9). Fearful names of the Underworld 
also should be suppressed and the opposite should be portrayed (Rep 387c). The guardians should 
be taught that death is not to be fear and that slavery is even worse than death itself (Rep 387b). 
The representations of the gods as simple, truthful, and responsible only for good, along with 
the portrayals of death as something not to be feared, are the models for which the guardians are 
to emulate. For Socrates, these stories about the gods, the dead, and spirits are to encourage citizens 
to honor them, their parents, and to value and love each other (Rep 386b). It also introduces the 
concepts of agency and responsibility for one’s own actions.13 The guardians will not be able to 
blame external forces, such as the gods, spirits, or a fear of death, for their deeds, if these teachings 
are to be believed.  
Socrates acknowledges the potency of Homeric poetry and the potential danger it brings to 
citizens—the “more poetic they are the more dangerous”—unless it is supervised by philosophers. 
Homer is to be admired for many things but not for his depictions of the gods as responsible for 
evil or that death is something to be feared (Rep 383a). Because of its foundational influence, 
Homeric poetry is not altogether banished from Socrates’ polis but it is modified to align with the 
new form of civic education that is required. 
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II. 
Socrates continues his censorship of poetry with how the gods, heroes, and people should be 
portrayed. Poets who claim that the unjust are happy and the just the opposite, that there is profit 
in injustice, and that justice is another person’s good and your own loss will be prohibited in 
Socrates’ polis with only the contrary teachings proclaimed (Rep 392b). The poets also will be 
barred from depicting heroes from doing shocking deeds, like the abductions of Helen and 
Persephone (Rep 391c–d) or the various examples of Achilles’ impious behavior: rebuking the 
gods Apollo and Spercheius (Rep 391a; Iliad 22.15, 20; 23.141–52), disobeying and fighting a god 
(Rep 391a; Iliad 21.232ff), desecrating Hector’s body (Rep 391a; Iliad 24.15–18), and slaughtering 
captives (Rep 391a; Iliad 23.175–76). As a hero, Achilles should not be shown as someone filled 
with the two conflicting impulses of slavish greed and overbearing arrogance towards gods and 
humans (Rep 391b–c).14 Such representations are harmful because they corrupt the young and 
people would excuse their own evil, being convinced that such things were being done to them 
(Rep 391e). 
The poets should also show that the gods cannot be bribed, as Homer claims with “gifts move 
gods and gifts persuade awesome kings” (Rep 390e; Iliad 9.515–23) or his portrayals of Achilles 
accepting Agamemnon’s gifts out of greed, his refusal to release Hector’s body without payment 
(Rep 390e–391a), or listening to the counsel of Phoenix who urges Achilles to defend the Achaeans 
if he receives gifts (Rep 390e; Iliad 19.278–81). However, Socrates misrepresents Homer’s 
account of Achilles, for Achilles has little interest in gifts and is not as greedy as Socrates accuses 
him to be. Achilles’ objection to Agamemnon was one of justice understood as a type of honor—
“but whatever we took by war from the cities have been distributed, and it is not right to take this 
back from men”—instead of greed (Iliad 1.124–27). Likewise, Achilles does not return Hector’s 
body because of want of payment but rather because of his grief over Patroclus. It is only when he 
overcomes his grief when meeting Priam does Achilles return Hector’s body to his father (Iliad 
24.507–15). 
This misrepresentation of Achilles is an example of Socrates modifying Homer’s poetry for his 
own philosophical ends. Socrates may not be interested about the real reason why Achilles refuses 
to defend the Achaeans but invokes this episode to illustrate a larger philosophical point about 
agency and responsibility: if the poets teach the gods can be bribed, then one can excuse one’s 
behavior and thereby responsibility for one’s deeds. Another reason why Socrates misportrays 
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Achilles is that he finds Achilles’ understanding of justice incomplete: the proper distribution of 
honor after victory in war. Instead of directly attacking Achilles’ definition of justice, a hero whom 
the Hellenes admire, Socrates depicts him as greedy and arrogant—a character attack that 
indirectly questions Achilles’ understanding of justice. 
The notion that the gods can be bribed undermines agency and responsibility for oneself, 
thereby making civic education impossible.15 This is why Socrates also censors poetry that 
portrays gods and heroes exhibiting emotional distress, whether it be Achilles (Rep 387d–388b; 
Iliad 24.10–12; 18.23–24), Priam (Rep 388b–c; Iliad 22.414–15), Thetis (Rep 388b–c; Iliad 
18.54), or Zeus (Rep 388c–d; Iliad 22.168–69; 16.433–34). This also applies to depictions of 
laughter, when gods and humans are overcome with it (Rep 389a; Iliad 1.599–600). Such 
representations of the gods and heroes do not make citizens temperate, teaching them that it is 
permissible not to control oneself (Rep 388d).  
For Socrates, Homer is particularly at fault among the poets for not promoting temperance. He 
represents Zeus lusting after Hera, forgetting all his plans, and making him want to lie with her on 
the ground rather than go to their bedroom (Rep 390c; Iliad 14.294–341). Homer also teaches that 
“hunger is the most piteous death” (Rep 390b; Odyssey 12.342) and describes Odysseus having 
said that the best things in life are “tables filled with bread, meat, and full cups of sweet wine” 
(Rep 390b; Odyssey 9.8–10). But, as Shorey points out, Socrates’ recitation of the Odyssey is 
misleading, for Odysseus thinks of music rather than food and wine as the best thing in life.16 But 
this misrepresentation, again, is a way for Socrates to illustrate his larger philosophical point about 
the need for temperance in civic education. By showing one of the Hellenes’ heroes, Odysseus, 
lack of temperance, Socrates is able reorient Hellenic civilization towards a more philosophic and 
virtuous future.  
Another instance when Socrates modifies Homer poetry for his own philosophical aims is when 
he approves of Homer’s characterization of Diomedes, who says: 
 
Friend, be quiet and attend to my words 
And what follows: 
In high spirits, the Achaeans march silently fearing their leaders.  
 (Rep 389e) 
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By citing Homer, Socrates underscores the importance of temperance to be installed into the 
guardians; however, the two passages do not follow one another, as Socrates claim. The first lines 
are from Book 4 of the Iliad where Diomedes silences Sthenelus after Agamemnon criticizes them 
(4.412). The lines that follow, “Friend, be quiet and attend to my words,” are below: 
 
I do not blame Agamemnon, shepherd of the people,  
For encouraging the Achaeans to battle.  
It is he who receive glory if the Achaeans defeat the  
Trojans and take scared Troy,  
And he, likewise, will receive all the blame if the Achaeans are slain.  
But come, let us call take the thoughts of spirited valor. 
 (Iliad 4.413–18) 
 
This passage does not speak of temperance but about the burdens of leadership and the call for 
valor. 
In the second line, “In high spirits, the Achaeans march silently fearing their leaders,” Socrates 
splices two different passages from the Iliad into a single one: “In high spirits, the Achaeans march 
silently, eager at heart to come and aid each other” (3.8) and “all silent as they were through fear 
of their commanders” (4.431). The first line is referring to both the Achaean and Trojan armies 
advancing to each other for battle before Paris proposes single combat with Menelaus; the second 
line refers to the same two armies but after the oath is broken.  
Although one could speculate about the significance of Socrates splicing lines from before and 
after the oath is broken, my task here is more mundane. By modifying Homer’s poetry to show 
how temperance is needed in his polis, Socrates indirectly shows that Homer’s poetry cannot be 
completely eradicated because of foundational role that Homer’s poetry plays in making the 
Hellenes a people. Socrates therefore must resort to censoring those passages of Homer that do not 
comport with his philosophical project and modify and adopt those passages that do. Admittedly, 
it is possible that Socrates just misquotes Homer; but I think it more likely that Socrates wants to 
retain some Homeric poetry because it is impossible to banish it entirely without dire 
consequences.  
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III. 
In spite of his criticism of Homer, Socrates does endorse some of his poetry when it suits his 
philosophical aims. An example is when Homer describes Odysseus as a model of self-control: 
 
He stuck his chest and chided his heart, 
Endure, my heart, for worse you have endured. 
 (Rep 390d; Odyssey 20.17–18) 
 
Socrates also praises Homer as a resource from which the philosophers could learn in the training 
of gymnastics for the guardians (Rep 404b). Socrates cites Homer’s portrayal of heroes on military 
campaigns as ones the guardians should emulate: eating only roast meat with fire, as it is the easiest 
meal to prepare, and not fish, broiled meat, sweets, or any food that comes from pots (Rep 404b–
c).  
Soldiers also should accept the medical treatment afforded them without complaint: nobody 
finds “fault with the girl who gave the wounded Eurpylus Pramnian wine sprinkled with barley 
and grated cheese, inflammatory ingredients” or “censured Patroclus who oversaw the case” (Rep 
405e–406a). This type of physical endurance is held in contrast to a polis where its citizens have 
become bloated with self-indulgence and disease. In this city, doctors are required not to cure some 
common illness but for aliments brought about by an indolent life (Rep 405a, 405d).17  
Socrates praises these Homeric passages because they align with his philosophical and 
pedagogical goals of civic education (i.e., teaching guardian children temperance and endurance). 
And, like previous episodes, Socrates incorrectly recounts Homer’s story by substituting Eurpylus 
for Machaon (Iliad 11.611–54), a story that he correctly tells in the Ion (538b–d). Machaon is a 
surgeon and medic, the son of Asclepius who is the god of medicine, while Eurpylus is a great 
soldier, having entered the Trojan horse. This character substitution allows a better way to appeal 
to the warrior ethos of the guardians by providing a model of one who is temperate, self-controlled, 
and capable of enduring the hardships of war. Again, I believe the modification of these Homeric 
lines are deliberate rather than accidental and underscores the pedagogical and civilizational 
importance that Homer plays among the Hellenes. 
Socrates also praises Homer when discussing thumos (spiritedness) and the need for temperance 
to control it. In Book IV Socrates repeats Homer’s description of Odysseus as a model of 
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temperance—“He stuck his chest and chided his heart”—but in the context of understanding the 
various parts of the human soul (Rep 441b–c, 390d; Odyssey 20.17–18). Here Homer teaches that 
the spirited part is separate and better than the irrational or desiring parts. Because the spirited part 
is superior to the irrational part of the soul, it must learn temperance in order for the guardians to 
know friend from foe. In their training of gymnastics and poetry, Odysseus is one of the models 
that the guardians can imitate to be temperate (Rep 441d–442d). 
The topics of thumos and Homer returns when Socrates discusses how one can identify and 
honor outstanding soldiers. Socrates cites Homer as a possible resource to teach them: “Even 
Homer agrees that is it is just to honor the young men who are good” (Rep 468d). An example 
would be when Homer describes Ajax, who had distinguished himself in war, as being honored 
with the whole backbone of a boar as the proper reward for his bravery (Rep 468c–d; Iliad 7.321). 
In this matter, Socrates says “we’ll believe Homer in that much”—an acknowledgment that Homer 
can teach philosophers about how to identify and honor outstanding soldiers—and reward those 
soldiers with “seats of honor and meat and full cups of sweet wine (Rep 468d, 390b; Odyssey 9.8–
10).  
Earlier in the dialogue Socrates cites the same passage from Homer, faulting him for not 
promoting temperance among citizens, while now he recites the same lines but to praise 
exceptional soldiers (Rep 390b, 468d). Although he refers to the same Homeric lines, Socrates’ 
use of them is different because of the new context of conversation: the discussion of warfare and 
how to distinguish and honor the best soldiers, whereas previously Socrates was examining what 
type of poetry is best suited for guardian children. One could assume that soldiers raised with 
philosophically-guided gymnastics and poetry as well as being taught the first two waves (i.e., the 
sexes are equal and women and children are to be held in common) that they would already be 
temperate and therefore could safely be seated at “tables filled with bread, meat, and full cups of 
sweet wine.”18 
Another instance when Socrates recites the same Homeric lines uttered earlier in the Republic 
is when he describes how the prisoners in the cave “confer offices, honors, and prizes” to those 
who are sharpest at spotting the passing shadows on wall (Rep 516d). When observing what his 
previous inmates are doing, the escaped prisoner feels like Achilles in Hades who would rather 
“toil the soil, a serf to another / to an indigent man without land” than be honored among the 
prisoners for best spotting the shadows (Rep 516d–e; Odyssey 11.489–90). Although Socrates does 
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not repeat the concluding line of the Homeric passage, “Than rule and be king over all the dead 
who have perished,” his point is the same: it is better to be a serf outside of the cave than a ruler 
in it. 
  
IV. 
Even when Socrates calls for a clean slate when founding his polis, he still refers to Homer. In his 
analogy of the philosopher as a painter, who looks at the just, beautiful, temperate, and other virtues 
as models when painting cities and people, Socrates says their judgment is based on “the likeness 
of humanity which Homer also called divine and god-like when it appeared in humans” (Rep 501a–
c). It is not possible for the philosopher to found a polis or educate a people ex nihilo because there 
is no cultural and civilizational material from which to draw. Socrates acknowledges this situation 
when he calls Homer as the “educator of the Hellas” (Rep 607a). Homer’s poetry is always present 
and, for Socrates, pervasive with the result that it must be tolerated but not entirely accepted as is. 
While we have seen earlier when Socrates recites Homeric passages to support his philosophical 
aims, he returns to criticizing Homer in Book X, going back to his initial assessment of his poetry 
in Books II and III. Although he speaks with “a certain friendliness and reverence for Homer that 
he has held since childhood,” for he is “the first teacher and beginner of all lovely tragedies,” 
Socrates honors truth before humans (Rep 595c).19 Socrates’ primary objection to the poets in 
Book X is that their poetry is a thrice-removed imitation of reality, with some people believing 
what the poets tell them is real even though the poets themselves do not truly know (Rep 599a).  
Homer is particularly to be blamed when he writes about the greatest and finest things: war, 
generalship, political rule, and the education of people (Rep 599c–d). Socrates issues a series of 
challenges to Homer to ask what polis acknowledges him as its lawgiver and benefactor, what war 
was fought under his leadership, what public service in practical affairs did he do or inventions did 
he create, or what school of thought he left behind: 
 
Is Homer reported while he lived to have been a guide in education to people whose 
pupils cherished his companionship and handed down a Homeric way of life, just 
as Pythagoras was honored for this and his disciples, even to this day, call it the 
“Pythagorean way,” which distinguishes them from everyone else? (Rep 599c–
600e) 
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The answers implied in Socrates’ rhetorical questionings are “no.” But, after closer examination, 
the correct answer could also be “yes”: as the “educator of Hellas,” Homer has established the 
civilizational foundation from which politics, war, education, and private affairs have developed 
for the Hellenes. Although there is no Homeric city, no Homeric way of war, no Homeric 
philosophy, the poet’s influence is so ubiquitous among the Hellenes that is appears invisible.20 
However, this is not the heart of Socrates’ criticisms of Homer. The problem with the poets is 
that they create thrice-removed images (phantoms) from reality which have “no hold on truth” 
(Rep 601a). The poet’s phantom is thrice-removed from reality because the poet imitates an 
imitation of reality and thereby is farthest from the truth when compared to the craftsman or 
philosopher (Rep 601a–602c).21 For example, the Platonic form of the table is known to the 
philosopher but is only illustrated by the painter, which is twice-removed from reality (Rep 507a–
c; 605a–c). Using the painter’s illustration as a model for his poetry, the poet’s verses are thrice-
removed and therefore further away from the truth than either the painter or philosopher. Thus, 
“all poetic imitators from Homer since” imitate phantoms of everything, including virtue, “but 
never touch the truth” (Rep 601a). 
Furthermore, the poets promote the irrational part in the soul, destroying people’s refinement 
and putting the rabble in charge of the polis (Rep 605b).22 Because of the potency of poetry, it can 
“arouse, feed, and strengthen” the irrational part of the soul where people can distinguish “neither 
larger nor smaller but thinks the same things now large and now small” (Rep 605b–c). Homer is 
especially good at this with a grief-stricken hero: 
 
delivering a tirade filled with laments or singing a dirge, while he beats his breast 
we are thrilled with pleasure; we surrender ourselves to the mood, sympathize with 
his suffering, and praise the poet as excellent who can most affect us in this way. 
(Rep 605d) 
 
But as a “maker of phantoms who stands far away from truth,” the poet can neither tell the truth 
nor promote reason but install “an evil regime” (Rep 605b–c). The poet therefore is to be barred 
from the polis, unless you want “pain and pleasure” to reign instead of “law and principles that are 
accepted by the community as the best” (Rep 605b; 607a). 
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Although Socrates only allows “hymns to the gods and eulogies for good humans” into his 
polis, he does not disparage Homer directly in Book X. Advising Glaucon, Socrates recommends 
 
whenever you run into people who eulogize Homer as the educator of Hellas, who 
say that he is worth studying for the governance and refinement of human affairs, 
and that every person should model one’s life after this poet, you must love and 
salute them for being the best people they can possibly be, agree that Homer is the 
most poetic of poets and the first of tragedians[.] (Rep 606e–607a) 
 
Socrates recommends not to criticize Homer directly, for Homeric poetry cannot be completely 
eradicated in “this ancient quarrel between philosophy and poetry” (Rep 607b). Socrates therefore 
must resort to a different strategy of praising Homer while coopting those Homeric passages that 
support his philosophical goals and censoring those that do not. 
 
V. 
Besides censoring some of the content of Homer’s poetry, Socrates also discusses how his poetry 
should be presented.23 Socrates classifies three types of styles of poetic presentation: pure 
narration, imitation, and a combination of the two (Rep 392d). Pure narration is reported—not 
direct—speech and action; imitation is direct speech or impersonation of people or gods; and the 
third style is a combination of pure narration and imitation.24  
To illustrate the difference between pure narration and imitation, Socrates cites the Homeric 
passage when Chryses asks Agamemnon to release his daughter (Rep 393a–b). When describing 
Chryses, Homer speaks as himself, an example of pure narration: 
 
And prayed in supplication to the Achaeans 
And most of all to the sons of Atreus, the twin commanders of the army. 
 (Rep 393a; Iliad 1.15–16) 
 
But what follows is imitation, when Homer speaks as Chryses rather than as himself (Rep 393b–
c).  
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Instead of concealing himself in his poetry, Homer should only employ pure narration. Showing 
how Homer should have portrayed Chryses rather than speaking as if he were him, Socrates states: 
 
the priest came and prayed that the gods might give them safely and the destruction 
of Troy, but they should accept the ransom and release his daughter out of reverence 
for the gods. When he had spoken, the others consented in reverence, but 
Agamemnon grew angry and told him to depart and not help him at all. His daughter 
would not be released, he said, but would grow old with him back in Argos. He 
ordered him to leave and not upset him, if he wished to get home unharmed. In fear 
and silence, the old man left, called on Apollo by his names, and reminded him of 
past favors—sacrifices and temples he had built. In return for these things he prayed 
that the Achaeans should suffer for his tears by the god’s arrows. (Rep 393e–394a; 
also see 601b) 
 
With the qualification that this example is without meter, Socrates illustrates how Homeric poetry 
that is imitative in style can be transformed into pure narration (Rep 393d).  
Just as he has “described in Homer,” Socrates also permits a combination of the two styles—
pure narration and imitation—for his polis but with the understanding that there little imitation and 
much pure narration (Rep 396e). Imitation is needed for poetry to be effective but must only be a 
small portion of it because of its potential bad influence in promoting the soul’s irrational part as 
well as providing bad models for people to emulate. Socrates points out that a worthless person 
will imitate anything with little or no narration, illustrating the power and problem that imitation 
poises to the philosopher (Rep 397a–b).25 
Since the human nature demands that one can only do something well if one imitates only one 
thing, the guardians should shun “clever imitations of slavish or shameful acts as they would act 
themselves (Rep 395c). The guardian children should imitate the qualities that make a good 
guardian: courage, temperance, liberality, reverence, etc. (Rep 395c). Imitation therefore is an 
effective and “enchanting” pedagogical practice, but it should be employed sparingly and modeled 
only after virtuous people (Rep 607d). 
However, the Republic appears to be a style of poetry that Socrates bans from his polis.26 The 
dialogue is either imitation—Socrates recollecting past events and impersonating himself and other 
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people—or a combination of pure narration and imitation but with much more of the latter than 
the former. But Socrates is not a poet (or, at least, he claims not to be). It is possible that he could 
be an “advocate” of poetry, as he describes below: 
 
And we would have advocates who are not poets but lovers of poetry to defend in 
prose and show that she not only delightful but useful to regimes and human living. 
And we’ll listen favorably, because we will profit if she is shown to be useful as 
well as pleasant. (Rep 607e) 
 
The advocate is someone who recognizes the power and influence of poetry as well as knows how 
to reform it. Socrates could be such a person as he attempts to show Glaucon and Adeimantus that 
the just life is superior to the unjust one. 
Although not a work of poetry, one of the most poetic passages in the Republic is the Myth of 
Er, which describes the soul’s immortality and that its genuine character can be known (Rep 612b). 
This passage is invoked by Socrates to directly refute Homer’s teaching that the unjust life is better 
than the just one. In this myth of reincarnation, Socrates weaves characters from Homeric poetry 
to show how living a philosophical life reaps its own rewards: Thamyras (Iliad 2.595–600), Ajax, 
Agamemnon, Atalanta, Epeius (Iliad 2.211–77), Thersites (Iliad 2.212–43), and Odysseus (Rep 
620a–d) are all shown in making their choices for their next lives. Instead of erasing them from 
his concluding myth of the dialogue, Socrates incorporate these Homeric characters as lessons of 
how one should choose justice. He has transformed what he has inherited from Homer into a new 
mythical founding for Hellas.  
Socrates does not have the option of sending poets “off to some other polis” while he will stick 
to his own “austere and cheerless storyteller because he is beneficial,” imitating only speeches of 
a righteous person (Rep 398a–b). The influence of Homer cannot be eradicated. Socrates therefore 
must rehabilitate Homeric poetry as much as philosophy will permit in his re-founding of Hellenic 
civilization. In this way, Socrates is able to preserve the foundational role that Homer plays for the 
Hellenes while simultaneously prepare them for a life of philosophy. 
Today in the United States, and perhaps even in the West itself, we are confronted with 
ideological polarization, political unrest, and social conflict.27 Some have argued for a return to 
the past of traditional values, while others seek to repudiate it entirely, dismissing it as racist, 
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misogynist, and fundamentally misguided. But these paths of reactionary politics or political 
revolution are ultimately dead-ends, for what both camps neglect is that our past is neither an 
Arcadia nor antiquated. Our past makes us who we are as a people. We can neither return to it nor 
can we transcend it. We must learn from Socrates who preserves and reforms what he could from 
his Homeric past in order to show his countrymen a possible, better future. 
 
 
Notes 
1. All in-text citations are my translation of the Greek text in the Loeb editions.  
2. Jaeger; Burkert; Veyne; Voegelin; Ahrensdorf, “Homer and the Foundation of Classical 
Civilization.” For more about Homeric values, refer to Adkins; Gagarin; Holway; Hammer; 
Ahrensdorf, Homer on the Gods and Human Virtue; for more about foundational myths, 
refer to Haarmann and Sweeney. 
3. For more about the role of how a people’s identity centers around myth, refer to Gadamer 
43; Burkert 119–25; Veyne; Voegelin 93–107. 
4. Murdoch; Elias; Annas, Introduction to Plato’s Republic; Nichols. 
5. Partee; Annas, “Plato on the Triviality of Literature” 11; Danto 6, 9, 194; Edmundson 7; 
Ferrari; Morgan 156; Burnyeat 255; Nehamas 251–78. 
6. Brisson 75; Zuckert 475–76; Avgousti 21–41. 
7. Strauss 61; Bloom; Most; Burns, “Philosophy and Poetry.” Burns interprets Homer as 
engaging in the same task as the philosopher with an exoteric teaching for the many and 
an esoteric one for the few. 
8. Brisson; Naddaff; Tanner; Collobert; Destrée; Kastely; also refer to Destrée and Herrmann.  
9. Halliwell and Mitscherling adopt a similar approach as mine. However, Halliwell looks at 
several dialogues without detailed analysis, while Mitscherling seeks only to demonstrate 
that Socrates does intentionally misquote Homer, with no explanation as to why. Altman 
employs a different type of reading, comparing Homer and Socrates but as being 
confronted with similar philosophical choices. For more about Socrates’ relationship to 
Homer and the gods, refer to Burns, “Friendship and Divine Justice in Homer’s Iliad”; 
Planinc; Lutz; van Riel; Ahrensdorf, Homer on the Gods and Human Virtue. 
10. For more about Hellenic civic education, refer to Nightingale; Ober. 
11. Like Aristotle (Politics 1260b38–1261a17) and contrary to Strauss and Bloom, I assume 
the Republic is read as offering an ideal polis. 
95 Trepanier 
12. Socrates also argues that lying is useful only for humans and not gods, if humans act like 
doctors and treat lying as a type of medicine. Thus, rulers can lie on account of enemies or 
citizens for the good of the state but citizens themselves should not lie. If any citizen does, 
he or she will be punished, “whether a prophet or healer or joiner of timbers” (Rep 389b, 
489d; Odyssey 17.383–84). Strauss, Bloom, and others interpret this passage as evidence 
of Socrates’ exoteric and esoteric teachings. However, it is equally possible that lying for 
the good of the state is an act of statesmanship to preserve the polis from its enemies, while 
citizens should not lie because it is unjust and appeals to the irrational part of their souls. 
Although the two readings differ in their interpretation, they are not necessarily 
incompatible with each other. 
13. Tanner 45–48; also refer to Gaskin. 
14. For an interpretation of Achilles in the context of changing civilizational values, refer to 
Baily. 
15. Another example when Socrates emphasizes human agency and responsibility is when he 
discusses the correspondence between the types of human characters and the regimes, 
asking Glaucon whether regimes are derived from human characters or from inanimate, 
insensible objects, as Homer claims (Rep 544d; Iliad 22.126; Odyssey 19.163). 
16. Shorey highlights this in Plato, Republic I 217nd; also see Aristotle’s Politics (1338a28). 
17. Socrates later return to medicine with reference to Homer, when he speaks of a civic-
minded Asclepius and his sons who all practice a medicine that only cures diseases and do 
not prescribe what their patients need to eat or drink because they already possessed 
temperance. The doctors only “sucked the blood, and applied soothing drugs” (Rep 408a; 
Iliad 4.218). They did not think that a naturally sick or self-indulgent person should be 
treated, as they were worthless to themselves and others. Even if they were richer than 
Midas, the doctor would not treat them (Rep 408b). 
18. Furthermore, as Shorey had noted, Socrates incorrectly recites this passage from the 
Odyssey, for Odysseus thinks music instead of food or wine as the best things in life (cf. 
Note 16 above).  
19. Socrates also speaks respectfully of Homer elsewhere in the Republic, even when he is 
about to censor his poetry. Some examples are: “We’ll admire Homer for many things, but 
not for making Zeus send a false dream to Agamemnon” (383a); “We’ll have to ask Homer 
and the other poets to forgive us for excising all such lines” (387b); “ask a favor of Homer 
and the rest of the poets” (387d); and “For Homer’s sake I’m reluctant to say it” (391a). 
These qualifications of Socrates’ criticisms of Homer reveals the power and hold of 
Homer’s poetry among the Hellenes. The philosopher therefore cannot completely banish 
Homeric poetry from his polis but instead cite and modify those passages that support 
philosophical aims and dismiss those that are contrary. 
20. Refer to Note 2 above. 
21. Nehamas 251–78. 
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22. For more about the parts of the soul, refer to Annas, “Plato on the Triviality of Literature” 
7–10; Burnyeat 223, 228; Fitzpatrick. 
23. I do not discuss the musical styles in the Republic as LeMoine does for this symposium; 
also refer to Kennedy; Thaler. 
24. Pure narration also refers to all literary representation, including direct speech. However, 
in this article I call pure narration as only reported speech and literary representation as all 
literary representation. 
25. However, a righteous person does not hesitate to narrate or imitate a good person but with 
an unworthy person he would be ashamed to do so (Rep 396c–e). 
26. Strauss 59; Rosen 19; for a contrary view, refer to Saxonhouse. 
27. For example, refer to Bishop; Hartman; Piereson. 
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